This paper brings together a number of threads in Nietzsche’s thought to present a genealogy and critique of the ontological category of “things”. Some of these threads are: Nietzsche’s “naturalisation” of Kant via Darwin and his evolutionary epistemology, his insights on language, consciousness and the self, his reflections on atomism and his contributions on how to overcome it via ideas of force and process metaphysics, and finally, his rejection of the Kantian thing-in-itself.
This paper is an effort to retrieve, connect and enhance certain ideas found throughout Nietzsche’s works that pertain to causality, in order to make a persuasive case of how our idea of causality came to be and what errors and naiveties were and may still be contained in it.
This paper is a product of a more general worry in Ethics. How do we adjudicate between moral systems that disagree? Are there rational ways with which can solve moral differences at the fundamental level? Can we create a general, impartial framework, which will help the adjudication?